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The private equity market is an important
source of funds for start-ups, private middle-
market companies, firms in financial distress,
and public firms seeking buyout financing.
1
Over the past fifteen years, it has been the
fastest growing market for corporate finance, far
surpassing others such as the public equity and
bond markets and the market for private place-
ment debt. Today the private equity market is
roughly one-quarter the size of both the market
for commercial and industrial bank loans and
the market for commercial paper in terms of
outstandings (Figure 1). In recent years, private
equity capital raised by partnerships has
matched, and sometimes exceeded, funds raised
through initial public offerings and gross
issuance of public high-yield corporate bonds.
Probably the most celebrated aspect of the pri-
vate equity market is the investment in small,
often high-tech, start-up firms. These invest-
ments often fuel explosive growth in such firms.
For example, Microsoft, Dell Computer, and
Genentech all received private equity backing
in their early stages. In addition, the private
equity market supplied equity funds in the huge
leveraged buyouts of such large public compa-
nies as Safeway, RJR Nabisco, and Beatrice in
the 1980s.
Despite its dramatic growth and increased
significance for corporate finance, the private
equity market has received little attention in the
financial press or the academic literature.
2 The
lack of attention is due partly to the nature of
the instrument itself. A private equity security is
exempt from registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission by virtue of its being
issued in transactions “not involving any public
offering.” Thus, information about private trans-
actions is often limited, and analyzing develop-
ments in this market is difficult.
This article examines the economic foun-
dations of the private equity market and
describes its institutional structure. First, I briefly
discuss the growth of the limited partnership 
as the major intermediary in the private equity
market over the last fifteen years. Next, I
explain the overall structure of the market,
focusing in turn on the major investors, inter-
mediaries, and issuers. I then look at returns 
to private equity over the last fifteen years.
Finally, I analyze the role of limited partner-
ships and why they are a particularly effective
form of intermediary in the private equity mar-
ket. This entails a detailed examination of the
contracts these partnerships write with their
investors and the companies in which the part-
nerships invest.
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THE GROWTH OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 
IN THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET
The private equity market consists of pro-
fessionally managed equity investments in the
unregistered securities of private and public com-
panies.
3 Professional management is provided
by specialized intermediaries called limited part-
nerships, which raise money from institutional
investors and invest it in both publicly and pri-
vately held corporations. Private equity man-
agers acquire large ownership stakes and take
an active role in monitoring and advising com-
panies in which they invest. They often exercise
as much or more control than company insiders.
The growth of private equity is a classic
example of how organizational innovation,
aided by regulatory and tax changes, can ignite
activity in a particular market. In this case, the
innovation was the widespread adoption of the
limited partnership as the means of organizing
private equity investments. Until the late 1970s,
private equity investments were undertaken
mainly by wealthy families, industrial corpora-
tions, and financial institutions investing directly
in issuing firms. By contrast, most investment
since 1980 has been undertaken by intermedi-
aries on behalf of institutional investors. The
major intermediary is the limited partnership;
institutional investors are the limited partners,
and professional investment managers are the
general partners.
The emergence of the limited partnership
as the dominant form of intermediary is a result
of the extreme information asymmetries and
incentive problems that arise in the private
equity market. The specific advantages of lim-
ited partnerships are rooted in the way in which
they address these problems. The general part-
ners specialize in finding, structuring, and man-
aging equity investments in closely held private
companies. Limited partnerships are among the
largest and most active shareholders with signif-
icant means of both formal and informal control
and thus can direct companies to serve the
interests of their shareholders. At the same time,
limited partnerships employ organizational and
contractual mechanisms that align the interests
of the general and limited partners.
Limited partnership growth was also fos-
tered by regulatory changes in the late 1970s
that permitted greater private equity investment
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by pension funds. The results of these changes
are telling: from 1980 to 1995, the amount of
capital under management in the organized pri-
vate equity market increased from roughly $4.7
billion to over $175 billion. In addition, limited
partnerships went from managing less than 50
percent of private equity investments to manag-
ing more than 80 percent (Figure 2).
4 Most of
the remaining private equity stock is held
directly by investors, but even much of this
direct investment activity is the result of knowl-
edge that these investors have gained investing
in and alongside limited partnerships.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZED 
PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET
The organized private equity market has
three major players and an assortment of minor
ones. Figure 3 illustrates how these players
interact with each other. The left-hand column
lists the major investors, the middle column lists
major intermediaries, and the right-hand col-
umn lists the major issuers in the private equity
market. Arrows pointing from left to right indi-
cate the flow of dollars and other services;
arrows pointing from right to left indicate the
flow of private equity securities or other claims.
The bottom of Figure 3 lists an assortment of
agents and investment advisors that help issuers
or intermediaries raise money or advise in-
vestors on the best intermediaries in which to
invest. The role of each of these players in the
private equity market is discussed below.
Investors
Figure 4 illustrates the total estimated pri-
vate equity outstanding at year-end 1996 and
the portions held by the various investor
groups. Public and corporate pension funds are
the largest groups, together holding roughly 40
percent of capital outstanding and currently
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supplying close to 50 percent of all new funds
raised by partnerships.
5 Public pension funds
are the fastest growing investor group and re-
cently overtook private pension funds in terms
of the amount of total private equity held. En-
dowments and foundations, bank holding com-
panies, and wealthy families and individuals each
hold about 10 percent of total private equity.
Insurance companies, investment banks, and
nonfinancial corporations are the remaining
major investor groups. Over the 1980s the
investor base within each investor group broad-
ened dramatically, but still only a minority of
institutions within each group (primarily the
larger institutions) hold private equity.
Most institutional investors invest in pri-
vate equity for strictly financial reasons, spe-
cifically because they expect the risk-adjusted
returns on private equity to be higher than
those on other investments and because of the
potential benefits of diversification.
6 Bank hold-
ing companies, investment banks, and nonfi-
nancial corporations may also invest in the
private equity market to take advantage of
economies of scope between private equity
investing and their other activities. Commercial
banks, for example, are large lenders to small
and medium-sized firms. As such, they have
contact with many potential candidates for pri-
vate equity. Conversely, by investing in a pri-
vate equity partnership, banks may be able to
generate lending opportunities to the firms in
which the partnership invests. Nonfinancial
firms typically invest in early-stage develop-
mental ventures that may fit with their competi-
tive and strategic objectives.
Intermediaries
Intermediaries—mainly limited partner-
ships—manage an estimated 80 percent of pri-
vate equity investments. Under the partnership
arrangement, institutional investors are the lim-
ited partners and a team of professional private
equity managers serves as the general partners.
Most often the general partners are associated
with a partnership management firm (such as
the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield
& Byers or the buyout group Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts & Co.). Some management companies
are affiliates of a financial institution (an insur-
ance company, bank holding company, or invest-
ment bank); the affiliated companies generally
are structured and managed no differently than
independent partnership management companies.
Investment companies not organized as
limited partnerships—Small Business Invest-
ment Companies (SBICs), publicly traded
investment companies, and other companies—
today play only a marginal role as intermedi-
aries in the private equity market.
7 SBICs,
established in 1958 to encourage investment in
private equity, can leverage their private capital
with loans from, or guaranteed by, the Small
Business Administration.
8 In the 1970s they
accounted for as much as one-third of private
equity investment, but today they account for
Figure 4
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less than $1 billion of the $176.5 billion market.
The reduced role of SBICs has resulted in part
from their inability to make long-term equity
investments when they themselves are financed
with debt. Publicly traded investment compa-
nies also played a role in the past, but today
fewer than a dozen such companies are active,
and together they manage less than $300 mil-
lion. Apparently the long-term nature of private
equity investing is not compatible with the
short-term investment horizons of stock analysts
and public investors.
9
The dramatic growth of the limited part-
nership as the major intermediary in the private
equity market is a result of the limited partner-
ship’s success in mitigating the severe informa-
tion problems that exist in the market—both for
institutional investors looking for appropriate
partnerships in which to invest and for part-
nerships looking for appropriate portfolio com-
pany investments. The mechanisms the limited
partnerships use to control these problems are
explored in detail in a following section.
Issuers
Issuers in the private equity market vary
widely in size and their motivation for raising
capital, as well as in other ways. They do share
a common trait, however: because private equity
is one of the most expensive forms of finance,
issuers generally are firms that cannot raise
financing from the debt or public equity markets.
Table 1 lists six major issuers of private
equity and their main characteristics. Issuers of
Table 1
Characteristics of Major Issuers in the Private Equity Market
Public and
private firms Other
Early-stage Later stage Middle-market in financial Public public
Characteristic new ventures new ventures private firms distress buyouts firms
Size Revenues Revenues Established, Any size Any size Any size
between between with stable
zero and $15 million cash flows
$15 million and $50 between
million $25 million and
$500 million
Financial High growth High growth Growth May be over- Under- Depend on
attributes potential potential prospects leveraged or performing reasons for
vary widely have operating seeking private
problems High levels of equity
free cash flow
Reason(s) for To start To expand plant To finance a To effect a To finance a To ensure
seeking private operations and operations required change turnaround change in confidentiality
equity in ownership or management or
To cash out capital structure in management To issue a
early-stage incentives small offering
investors To expand by
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traditional venture capital are young firms, most
often those developing innovative technologies
that are predicted to show very high growth
rates in the future. They may be early-stage
companies, those still in the research and devel-
opment stage or the earliest stages of com-
mercialization, or later stage companies, those
with several years of sales but still trying to
grow rapidly.
Since 1980, nonventure private equity
investment—comprising investments in estab-
lished public and private companies—has out-
paced venture investment, as illustrated in
Figure 5. Nonventure investments include those
in middle-market companies (roughly, those
with annual sales of $25 million to $500 mil-
lion), which have become increasingly attractive
to private equity investors. Many of these com-
panies are stable, profitable businesses in 
low-technology manufacturing, distribution, ser-
vices, and retail industries. They use the private
equity market to finance expansion—through
new capital expenditures and acquisitions—
and to finance changes in capital structure and
in ownership (the latter increasingly the result
of private business owners reaching retirement
age).
Public companies also are issuers in the
nonventure sector of the private equity market.
Such companies often issue a combination of
debt and private equity to finance their man-
agement or leveraged buyout. Indeed, between
the mid- and late 1980s such transactions
absorbed most new nonventure private equity
capital. Public companies also issue private
equity to help them through periods of financial
distress, to avoid registration costs and public
disclosures, and to raise funds during periods
when their industry is out of favor with public
market investors.
Agents and Advisors
Also important in the private equity mar-
ket is a group of “information producers” whose
role has increased significantly in recent years.
These are the agents and advisors who place
private equity, raise funds for private equity
partnerships, and evaluate partnerships for
potential investors. They exist because they
reduce the costs associated with the information
problems that arise in private equity investing.
Agents facilitate private companies’ searches for
equity capital and limited partnerships’ searches
for institutional investors; they also advise on
the structure, timing, and pricing of private
equity issues and assist in negotiations. Advisors
facilitate institutional investors’ evaluations of
limited partnerships; they may be particularly
valuable to financial institutions unfamiliar with
the workings of the private equity market.
RETURNS IN THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET
A major reason for the explosive growth
of the private equity market since 1980 has been
the anticipation by institutional investors of
returns substantially higher than can be earned
in alternative markets. Of course, private equity
investments are regarded as considerably more
risky and more illiquid than other assets. For
those institutional investors that can bear such
risk and illiquidity, however, the high expected
returns are a major attraction.
Available data indicate that returns to pri-
vate equity have at times far exceeded returns
in the public market. Table 2 shows internal
Table 2
Average Internal Rates of Return for Venture and 
Nonventure Private Equity Limited Partnerships 
and for Public Small-Company Stocks
Average annual return (percent)
Partnerships Venture Nonventure Public small-
formed in: capital capital company stocks
1969–79 23.3 — 11.5*
1980–84 10.0 24.8 15.3†
1985–89 15.2 15.3 13.4‡
1990–91 24.1 28.9 15.6§
* Over the period 1969 to 1988.
† Over the period 1980 to 1993.
‡ Over the period 1985 to 1996.
§ Over the period 1990 to 1996.
SOURCE: Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1997).
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rates of return on venture and nonventure 
private equity partnerships during the period 
in which the partnership was formed. These
returns are those experienced by the limited
partners; they are measured net of management
fees and other partnership expenses. Returns 
to partnerships that have not yet been liqui-
dated reflect the valuation of a residual com-
ponent comprising investments whose market
values are unknown but are often reported at
cost. This may bias downward the returns re-
ported for the funds formed from the mid-1980s
onward.
Overall, Table 2 suggests that returns to
private equity have generally been above those
experienced in the public equity market. The
fourth column of Table 2 shows the annual
average returns on a portfolio of public small-
company stocks over various periods. These
periods are intended to be roughly comparable
with the ones during which the partnerships
listed were earning the bulk of their returns.
10
Except for the early 1980s, returns to both ven-
ture and nonventure private equity are greater
than returns to public small-company stocks,
sometimes substantially so. Whether this is
enough to compensate investors for the in-
creased risk of such investments is, of course,
another matter. However, as mentioned above,
returns for more recent partnerships may be
biased downward.
Table 2 also suggests that returns have
been higher for nonventure than for venture
partnerships. This pattern may partly explain
the faster growth of the later stage and, particu-
larly, nonventure sectors of the private equity
market over the past fifteen years.
To a certain extent, returns are driven by
capital availability. For venture investments, for
example, returns have been greatest on invest-
ments made during periods when relatively
small amounts of capital were available (Figure
6 ). Conversely, there is concern, if not a large
amount of evidence, that periods of greater 
capital availability depress future returns.
THE ROLE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS IN THE
PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET
Accompanying the rapid growth of the
private equity market in the 1980s was the rise
of professionally managed limited partnerships
as intermediaries, as illustrated in Figure 2. In
certain respects, the success of limited partner-
ships is paradoxical. Funds invested in such
partnerships are illiquid over the partnership’s
life, which in some cases runs more than ten
years. During this period, investors have little
control over the way their funds are managed.
Nevertheless, the increasing dominance of lim-
ited partnerships suggests that they benefit both
investors and issuers.
Table 3 provides an overview of the mech-
anisms that are used to align the interests of 
(1) the limited and general partners and (2) the
partnerships and the management of the com-
panies in which they invest. These mechanisms
can be categorized under the broad headings of
performance incentives and direct means of
control.
As shown on the left-hand side of Table 3,
performance incentives that align the interests
of the limited and general partners are twofold.
First, the general partners must establish a favor-
able track record to raise new partnerships.
Second, they operate under a pay-for-perform-
ance scheme in which most of their expected
compensation is a share of the profits earned on
Table 3
Mechanisms Used to Align the Interests of Participants 
in the Private Equity Market
Limited partners – general partners Partnership – portfolio companies
Performance incentives Performance incentives
Reputation Managerial ownership
General partner compensation Managerial compensation
Direct means of control Direct means of control
Partnership covenants Voting rights
Advisory boards Board seats
Access to capital
NOTE: Most important mechanisms are in bold type.
Figure 6
Capital Raised by Venture Capital Partnerships
and Internal Rates of Return as of 1995
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investments. These provisions are the principal
means by which the interests of the general and
limited partners are harmonized. Of secondary
importance are direct control mechanisms such
as partnership agreements and advisory boards
composed of limited partners. Partnership
agreements give limited partners restricted
direct control over the general partners’ activi-
ties. These agreements consist mainly of restric-
tions on allowable investments and other
partnership covenants, which the advisory
board can waive by majority vote.
In contrast, the direct means of oversight
and control are the principal mechanisms for
aligning the interests of the partnership and
portfolio company management. The most
important of these mechanisms are a partner-
ship’s voting rights, its seats on the company
board, and its ability to control companies’
access to additional capital. Performance
incentives for company management, includ-
ing managerial ownership of stock, are also
important but are secondary to direct partner-
ship control.
Information Problems in Private Equity Investing
Two types of problems frequently occur
when outsiders finance a firm’s investment
activity—sorting problems and incentive prob-
lems. Sorting (or adverse selection) problems
arise in the course of selecting investments.
Firm owners and managers typically know
much more about the condition of their busi-
ness than do outsiders, and it is in their interest
to accent the positive while downplaying poten-
tial difficulties (see Leland and Pyle 1977; Ross
1977). Incentive (or moral hazard) problems
arise in the course of the firm’s operations.
Managers have many opportunities to take
actions that benefit themselves at the expense of
outside investors.
Private equity is used in financing situa-
tions in which the sorting and incentive prob-
lems are especially severe.
11 Resolving these
problems requires that investors engage in in-
tensive preinvestment due diligence and postin-
vestment monitoring. These activities are not
efficiently performed by large numbers of in-
vestors; there can either be too much of both
types of activities because investors duplicate
each others’ work, or too little of each owing 
to the tendency for investors to free ride on the
efforts of others. Thus, delegating these activi-
ties to a single intermediary is potentially efficient.
The efficiency of intermediation depends
on how effectively the sorting and incentive
problems between the ultimate investors and
intermediaries can be resolved.
12 In the private
equity market, reputation plays a key role in
addressing these problems because the market
consists of a few actors that repeatedly interact
with each other. For example, partnership man-
agers that fail to establish a favorable track
record may subsequently be unable to raise
funds or participate in investment syndicates
with other partnerships.
13
Overview of Private Equity Partnerships
Private equity partnerships are limited
partnerships in which the senior managers of a
partnership management firm serve as the gen-
eral partners and institutional investors are the
limited partners. The general partners are
responsible for managing the partnership’s
investments and contributing a very small pro-
portion of the partnership’s capital (most often,
1 percent); the limited partners provide the bal-
ance and bulk of the investment funds.
Each partnership has a contractually fixed
lifetime—generally ten years—with provisions
to extend the partnership, usually in one- or
two-year increments, up to a maximum of four
years. During the first three to five years, the
partnership’s capital is invested. Thereafter, the
investments are managed and gradually liqui-
dated. As the investments are liquidated, distri-
butions are made to the limited partners in the
form of cash or securities. The partnership man-
agers typically raise a new partnership fund at
about the time the investment phase for an
existing partnership has been completed. Thus,
the managers are raising new partnership funds
approximately every three to five years and at
any one time may be managing several funds,
each in a different phase of its life. Each part-
nership is legally separate, however, and is
managed independently of the others.
A partnership typically invests in ten to
fifty portfolio companies (two to fifteen compa-
nies a year) during its three- to five-year invest-
ment phase. The number of limited partners is
not fixed: most private equity partnerships have
ten to thirty, though some have as few as one
and others more than fifty.
14 The minimum com-
mitment is typically $1 million, but partnerships
that cater to wealthy individuals may have a
lower minimum and larger partnerships may
have a $10 million to $20 million minimum.
Most partnership management firms have
six to twelve senior managers who serve as 
general partners, although many new firms 
are started by two or three general partners 
and a few large firms have twenty or more.
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associates—general partners in training—usu-
ally in the ratio of one associate to every one or
two general partners. General partners often
have backgrounds as entrepreneurs and senior
managers in industries in which private equity
partnerships invest and, to a lesser extent, in
investment and commercial banking.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PARTNERSHIP 
AND ITS PORTFOLIO COMPANIES
Partnership managers receive hundreds of
investment proposals each year. Of these pro-
posals, only about 1 percent are chosen for
investment. The partnership managers’ success
depends upon their ability to select these pro-
posals efficiently. Efficient selection is properly
regarded as more art than science and depends
on the acumen of the general partners acquired
through experience operating businesses as
well as experience in the private equity field.
Investment proposals are first screened to
eliminate those that are unpromising or that fail
to meet the partnership’s investment criteria.
Private equity partnerships typically specialize
by type of investment and by industry and 
location of the investment. Specialization re-
duces the number of investment opportunities
considered and reflects the degree of special-
ized knowledge required to make successful
investment decisions.
This initial review consumes only a few
hours and results in the rejection of up to 90
percent of the proposals the partnership
receives. In many cases, the remaining pro-
posals are subjected to a second review, which
may take several days. Critical information
included in the investment proposal is verified
and the major assumptions of the business plans
are scrutinized. As many as half the proposals
that survived the initial screening are rejected at
this stage.
Proposals that survive these preliminary
reviews become the subject of a more compre-
hensive due-diligence process that can last up
to six weeks. It includes visits to the firm; meet-
ings and telephone discussions with key
employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors;
and the retention of outside lawyers, accoun-
tants, and industry consultants. For proposals
that involve new ventures, the main concerns
are the quality of the firm’s management and
the economic viability of the firm’s product or
service (Gladstone 1988). For proposals involv-
ing established firms, the general objective is to
gain a thorough understanding of the existing
business, although the precise focus of the
investigation varies with the type of investment.
With distressed companies, efforts are focused
on discussions with the company’s lenders; for
buyouts of family-owned businesses, manage-
ment succession issues will warrant greater
attention; and for highly leveraged acquisitions,
efforts will focus on developing detailed cash-
flow projections.
Extensive due diligence in the private
equity market is needed because little, if any,
information about issuers is publicly available
and in most cases the partnership has had no
relationship with the issuer. Thus, the partner-
ship must rely heavily on information that it can
produce de novo. Moreover, the management of
the issuing firm typically knows more than out-
siders do about many aspects of its business.
This information asymmetry, combined with the
fact that issuing private equity is very expensive,
has the potential to create severe adverse selec-
tion problems for investors. In the private equity
market, this problem is mitigated by the exten-
sive amount of due diligence and by the fact
that alternative sources of financing for private
equity issuers are limited.
Information asymmetries between inves-
tors and managers of the issuing firm give rise
to a potential moral hazard problem, whereby
management pursues its own interests at the
expense of investors. Private equity partnerships
rely on various mechanisms to align the in-
terests of managers and investors. These mech-
anisms can be classified into two main
categories. The first category comprises mecha-
nisms that relate to performance incentives,
including the level of managerial stock owner-
ship, the type of private equity issued to
investors, and the terms of management
employment contracts. The second comprises
mechanisms that relate to direct means of con-
trol of the firm, including board representation,
allocation of voting rights, and control of access
to additional financing. These mechanisms are
examined in turn.
Performance Incentives
Managerial Stock Ownership. Private equity
managers usually insist that the portfolio firm’s
senior managers own a significant share of their
company’s stock, and stock ownership often
accounts for a large part of managers’ total com-
pensation. In venture capital, management
stock ownership varies widely depending upon
the management’s financial resources and the
company’s financing needs and projected future
value. It also depends upon the number of
rounds of financing, as dilution typically occurs30
uating the firm’s performance, and contributing
significantly to the firm’s business and financial
planning process.
General partners can be extremely influ-
ential and effective outside directors. As large
stakeholders, they have an incentive to incur the
expense necessary to monitor the firm.
Moreover, they have the resources to be effec-
tive monitors—in the form of their own staff
members, information acquired during the due-
diligence process, and the expertise acquired
while monitoring similar companies.
Private equity partnerships in many cases
dominate the boards of their portfolio compa-
nies. Lerner (1994) reports that general partners
hold more than one-third of the seats on the
boards of venture-backed biotechnology firms,
which is more than the share held by manage-
ment or other outside directors. Even if it is a
minority investor, a private equity partnership
usually has at least one board seat and is able to
participate actively in a company’s management.
Allocation of Voting Rights. For early-stage
new ventures, leveraged buyouts, and finan-
cially distressed firms, the investment is often
large enough to confer majority ownership. In
other situations, the partnership may obtain 
voting control even if it is not a majority share-
holder. Even if the partnership lacks voting 
control, however, it is generally the largest non-
management shareholder. Thus, it has a dispro-
portionate degree of influence on matters that
come to a shareholder vote.
In general, a partnership’s voting rights 
do not depend on the type of stock issued. 
For example, holders of convertible preferred
stock may be allowed to vote their shares on 
an “as-converted” basis. Similarly, subordinated
debt can be designed so that investors have 
voting rights should a vote take place. The issue
of voting control can also be addressed by 
creating separate classes of voting and nonvot-
ing stock.
Control of Access to Additional Financing.
Partnerships can also exercise control by pro-
viding a company with continued access to
funds. This is especially the case for new ven-
tures. Venture capital is typically provided to
portfolio companies in several rounds at fairly
well-defined development stages, generally
with the amount provided just enough for the
firm to advance to the next stage of develop-
ment. Even if diversification provisions in the
partnership agreement prevent the partnership
itself from providing further financing, the gen-
eral partners have the power, through their
extensive contacts, to bring in other investors.
with each round. Even in later stage companies,
however, management ownership of 20 percent
is not unusual. For nonventure companies,
managerial share ownership usually ranges
between 10 percent and 20 percent.
A common provision in both venture and
nonventure financing is an equity “earn-out”
(Golder 1983). This arrangement allows man-
agement to increase its ownership share (at the
expense of investors) if certain performance
objectives are met.
Type of Private Equity Issued to Investors.
Convertible preferred stock is the private equity
security most frequently issued to investors. The
major difference between convertible preferred
stock and common stock is that holders of pre-
ferred stock are paid before holders of common
stock in the event of liquidation. From the part-
nership’s standpoint, this offers two advantages.
First, it reduces the partnership’s investment
risk. Second, and more important, it provides
strong performance incentives to the company’s
management because management typically
holds either common stock or warrants to pur-
chase common stock. If the company is only
marginally successful, its common stock will be
worth relatively little. Thus, the use of convert-
ible preferred stock mitigates moral hazard
problems. Subordinated debt with conversion
privileges or warrants is sometimes used as an
alternative way of financing the firm: it confers
the same liquidation preference to investors as
convertible preferred equity and, thus, the same
performance incentives to management.
Management Employment Contracts. In
principle, management’s equity position in the
firm could induce excessive risk taking.
However, management compensation can also
be structured to include provisions that penalize
poor performance, thereby offsetting incentives
for risk taking. Such provisions often take the
form of employment contracts that specify 
conditions under which management can be
replaced and buyback provisions that allow the
firm to repurchase a manager’s shares in the
event that he or she is replaced.
Mechanisms of Direct Control
Although managerial incentives are a very
important means of aligning the interests of
management and investors, a private equity
partnership relies primarily on its ability to exer-
cise control over the firm to protect its interests.
Board Representation. In principle, a firm’s
board of directors bears the ultimate responsi-
bility for the management of the firm, including
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Conversely, if the original partnership is unwill-
ing to arrange for additional financing, it is
unlikely that any other partnership will choose
to do so; the reluctance of the original partner-
ship is a strong signal that the company is a
poor investment.
Nonventure capital is also provided in
stages, though to a lesser extent. For example,
middle-market firms that embark on a strategy
of acquisitions periodically require capital infu-
sions to finance growth; that capital is not pro-
vided all at once. Similarly, companies that
undergo leveraged buyouts are forced to service
debt out of free cash flow and subsequently
must justify the need for any new capital
(Palepu 1990).
Other Control Mechanisms. Other mecha-
nisms by which partnerships control and moni-
tor the activities of the companies in which they
invest include covenants that give the partner-
ship the right to inspect the company’s facilities,
books, and records and to receive timely finan-
cial reports and operating statements. Other
covenants require that the company not sell
stock or securities, merge or sell the company,
or enter into large contracts without the
approval of the partnership.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LIMITED PARTNERS
AND THE GENERAL PARTNERS
By investing through a partnership rather
than directly in issuing firms, investors delegate
to the general partners the labor-intensive
responsibilities of selecting, structuring, manag-
ing, and eventually liquidating private equity
investments. However, limited partners must be
concerned with how effectively the general
partners safeguard their interests. Among the
more obvious ways in which general partners
can further their own interests at the expense of
the limited partners are spending too little effort
monitoring and advising portfolio firms, charg-
ing excessive management fees, taking undue
investment risks, and reserving the most attrac-
tive investment opportunities for themselves.
Private equity partnerships address these
problems in two basic ways: by using mecha-
nisms that relate to performance incentives and
mechanisms that relate to direct means of con-
trol. Performance incentives are the more
important means of aligning general partners’
interests with those of the limited partners.
These incentives involve the general partners’
need to protect their reputations and the terms
of the general partners’ compensation structure,
such as their share of the profits. These incen-
tives can significantly curtail the general part-
ners’ inclination to engage in behavior that does
not maximize value for investors. Direct control
mechanisms in the partnership agreement are
relatively less important means of controlling
the moral hazard problem between general and
limited partners.
Performance Incentives
Reputation. Partnerships have finite lives.
To remain in business, private equity managers
must regularly raise new funds, and fund raising
is less costly for more reputable firms. In fact, to
invest in portfolio companies on a continuous
basis, managers must raise new partnerships
once the funds from the existing partnership 
are fully invested, or about once every three to
five years.
Raising partnership funds is time consum-
ing and costly, involving presentations to insti-
tutional investors and their advisors that can
take from two months to well over a year,
depending on the general partners’ reputation
and experience. A favorable track record is
important because it conveys some information
about ability and suggests that general partners
will take extra care to protect their reputation.
Also, experience itself is regarded as an asset.
To minimize their expenses, partnership man-
agers generally turn first to those who invested
in their previous partnerships—assuming, of
course, that their previous relationships were
satisfactory.
Certain features of a partnership enhance
the ability of the general partners to establish a
reputation. These features essentially make both
the partnership’s performance and the man-
agers’ activities more transparent to investors
than might be the case for other financial inter-
mediaries. One such feature is segregated
investment pools. By comparing one partner-
ship’s investment returns with those of other
partnerships raised at the same time, it is easier
to account for factors that are beyond the con-
trol of the general partners, such as the stage of
the business cycle or the condition of the mar-
ket for initial public offerings, mergers, and
acquisitions. By contrast, if private equity inter-
mediaries did not maintain segregated invest-
ment pools, earnings would represent a blend
of investment returns that occur at different
stages of the business cycle or under different
market conditions.
Another feature is the separation of man-
agement expenses and investment funds. In a
limited partnership, management fees are spec-
ified in the partnership agreement (described32
below). Thus, the amount of investment capital
that can be consumed in the form of manager
salaries and other perquisites is capped. More-
over, because such expenses are transparent, it
is easier to compare expenses across partner-
ships. Other types of financial intermediaries
pay expenses and finance investments out of
the same funds raised from investors; although
expenses are reported, they are difficult to con-
trol before the fact and are not always transpar-
ent after the fact.
Compensation Structure. General partners
earn a management fee and a share of a part-
nership’s profits, the latter known as carried
interest. For a partnership that yields average
returns, carried interest may be several times
larger than the management fees (Sahlman
1990). This arrangement—providing limited
compensation for making and managing invest-
ments and significant compensation in the form
of profit sharing—lies at the heart of the part-
nership’s incentive structure.
Management fees are frequently set at a
fixed percentage of committed capital and
remain at that level over the partnership’s life.
Fee percentages range from 1 percent to 3 per-
cent. Carried interest is most often set at 20 
percent of the partnership’s net return.
Direct Control Mechanisms
Partnership agreements also protect lim-
ited partners’ interests through covenants that
place restrictions on a partnership’s investments
and on other activities of the general partners.
Restrictions on investments are especially im-
portant because a considerable portion of the
general partners’ compensation is in the form of
an option-like claim on the fund’s assets. This
form of compensation can lead to excessive risk
taking. In particular, it may be in the interest of
the general partners to maximize the partner-
ship’s risk—and hence the expected value of
their carried interest—rather than the partner-
ship’s risk-adjusted expected rate of return.
To address the problem of excessive risk
taking, partnership covenants usually set limits
on the percentage of the partnership’s capital
that may be invested in a single firm. Covenants
may also preclude investments in publicly
traded and foreign securities, derivatives, other
private equity funds, and private equity invest-
ments that deviate significantly from the part-
nership’s primary focus. Finally, covenants
usually restrict the fund’s use of debt and in
many cases require that cash from the sale of
portfolio assets be distributed to investors
immediately.
Partnership covenants also limit deal fees
(by requiring that deal fees be offset against
management fees), restrict coinvestment with
the general partners’ earlier or later funds, and
restrict the ability of general partners and their
associates to coinvest selectively in the partner-
ship’s deals.
Finally, partnership agreements allow lim-
ited partners some degree of oversight over the
partnership. Most partnerships have an advisory
board composed of the largest limited partners.
These boards help resolve conflicts involving
deal fees and conflict-of-interest transactions.
They do so by approving exemptions from part-
nership covenants. Special committees are also
created to help determine the value of the part-
nership’s investments. However, these two
types of bodies do not provide the kind of man-
agement oversight that a board of directors can
for a corporation; indeed, their power is limited
by the legal nature of the partnership, which
prohibits limited partners from taking an active
role in management.
CONCLUSION
This article has presented an economic
analysis of the private equity market. In par-
ticular, it has detailed how the contracts that
limited partnerships write with investors and
portfolio firms address many of the adverse
selection and moral hazard problems that face
investors considering investments in small and
medium-sized firms.
The private equity market’s success in
addressing these problems is evidenced by the
large number of successful firms that received
initial financing in this market. This success has
been much admired in the rest of the indus-
trialized world, particularly in Japan and
Germany. In these countries, private equity mar-
kets of the U.S. kind do not exist, primarily due
to the heavily regulated nature of their securities
markets, and so firms rely much more on bank
financing. While such bank-centered systems
may have had advantages in the past, there is 
an increasing feeling that such systems may 
not adequately provide funds for small and
medium-sized firms that are the engine of future
economic growth and innovation. Both Japan
and Germany have recently taken steps to
deregulate their financial markets. By fostering
the growth of U.S. private equity market prac-
tices, these countries hope to solve the informa-
tional and governance problems of small firms
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NOTES
1 This article draws selectively from a longer, more 
comprehensive research paper on the private equity
market by Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1997).
2 Some studies have been made of particular market
sectors, such as venture capital and leveraged buy-
outs (LBOs) of large public companies. On venture
capital, see Sahlman (1990) and special issues of
Financial Management (1994) and The Financier
(1994). For a summary of the LBO literature, see
Jensen (1994).
3 An equity investment is any form of security that has an
equity participation feature. The most common forms are
common stock, convertible preferred stock, and sub-
ordinated debt with conversion privileges or warrants.
4 The emergence of limited partnerships is actually
more dramatic than these figures indicate. As recently
as 1977, limited partnerships managed less than 20
percent of the private equity stock.
5 These and other figures in this section are my esti-
mates based on information from a variety of sources.
See Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1997) for details on how
these estimates are constructed.
6 Private equity is often included in a portfolio of “alter-
native assets” that also includes distressed debt,
emerging market stocks, real estate, oil and gas, 
timber and farmland, and economically targeted
investments.
7 Two other types of private equity organizations are
SBICs owned by bank holding companies and venture
capital subsidiaries of nonfinancial corporations. Both
types were extremely important in the 1960s, and they
still manage significant amounts of private equity. How-
ever, these organizations invest only their corporate
parent’s capital. In this sense, neither is really an inter-
mediary but rather a conduit for direct investments. 
I treat the investments by these organizations as direct
investments, not as investments by intermediaries.
8 See the Venture Capital Journal, October 1983.
9 This, of course, raises the question of why private
equity investments haven’t proven to be ideal for
closed-end mutual funds, wherein the fund invests
money for the long term but investors can get out in
the short term.
10 For example, partnerships in the first row were formed
between the years 1969 and 1979. These funds would
have invested and earned returns on their capital
between the years 1969 and 1988. The first row/fourth
column thus shows the annual average return to public
small companies over this 20-year period. Returns for
small-company stocks for the other periods are simi-
larly calculated. Returns for small-company stocks are
after transactions costs (Ibbotson 1997).
11 In venture investing, for example, the firm is often a
start-up with no track record. In a leveraged buyout,
while there may be ample information about the firm,
management may have little or no incentive to act in
equityholders’ best interests.
12 If, for example, investors must investigate the interme-
diary to the same extent that they would investigate
the investments that the intermediary makes on their
behalf, using one may be less efficient (Diamond 1984).
13 Intermediaries are also important because selecting,
structuring, and managing private equity investments
require considerable expertise. Gaining such exper-
tise requires a critical mass of investment activity that
most institutional investors cannot attain on their own.
Managers of private equity intermediaries are able to
acquire such expertise through exposure to and 
participation in a large number of investment oppor-
tunities. Although institutional investors could also 
specialize in this way, they would lose the benefits of
diversification. Finally, intermediaries play an important
role in furnishing business expertise to the firms in
which they invest. Reputation, learning, and speciali-
zation all enhance an intermediary’s ability to provide
these services. For example, a reputation for investing
in well-managed firms is valuable in obtaining the ser-
vices of underwriters. Likewise, specialization allows
an intermediary to more effectively assist its portfolio
companies in hiring personnel, dealing with suppliers,
and helping in other operations-related matters.
14 Many partnerships that have a single limited partner
have been initiated and organized by the limited part-
ner rather than by the general partner. Such limited
partners are in many cases nonfinancial corporations
that want to invest for strategic as well as financial 
reasons—for example, a corporation that wants expo-
sure to emerging technologies in its field.
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